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Optimal mechanism
Results: 68

#	Item
11	Optimal Voting Rules Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi July 31, 2016 Abstract We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2016-07-31 07:25:14 Game theory Social choice theory Decision theory Mechanism design Public choice theory Politics Political philosophy Voting theory Incentive compatibility Voting system Preference Voting
12	Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Decision theory Gaming Bayesian-optimal mechanism Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Virtual valuation
13	Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-03-17 23:29:32 Mechanism design Game theory Decision theory Gaming Mathematics Bayesian-optimal mechanism Virtual valuation Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Valuation
14	CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-01-31 23:29:10 Auction theory Auctions Game theory Mechanism design Mathematics Marketing VickreyClarkeGroves auction Valuation Auction Submodular set function Vickrey auction Bayesian-optimal mechanism
15	Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Add to Reading List Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57 Game theory Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Social choice theory Auction Double auction Bayesian-optimal pricing
16	Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Sampling Bayesian-optimal mechanism Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Prior-independent mechanism Virtual valuation Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction
17	Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types Ruben Hoeksma1 and Marc Uetz2 1 2 Add to Reading List Source URL: dii.uchile.cl Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 18:08:00 Operations research Combinatorial optimization Linear programming Convex optimization Integer programming Mathematical optimization Polyhedral combinatorics
18	Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-05-12 00:18:06 Mechanism design Auction theory Game theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Virtual valuation Auction English auction Prior-free mechanism Bayesian-optimal mechanism
19	T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity Add to Reading List Source URL: theoryofcomputing.org Language: English - Date: 2014-11-14 13:01:36 Matroid theory Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Matroid Submodular set function Vickrey auction Uniform matroid Bayesian-optimal mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction Sponsored search auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
20	Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu∗ Abstract We study the revenue maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:04 Mathematical optimization Operations research Dynamic programming Pricing Marketing Mechanism design Yield management Economic model Economics Macroeconomic model Monopoly Optimal stopping

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